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management opposition, it also offers tactical lessons that are relevant beyond the confines of academia. 
Perhaps most important, the Harvard case presents us with a distinct organizing and bargaining model 
whose relevance to other organizing efforts deserves careful evaluation: the Harvard Union of Clerical and 
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Organizing and Representing 
Clerical Workers 
The Harvard Model 
Richard W. Hurd 
The private sector clerical work force is largely nonunion, simulta-neously offering the labor movement a major source of potential membership growth and an extremely difficult challenge. Based on 
December 1990 data, there are eighteen million workers employed in office 
clerical, administrative support, and related occupations. Eighty percent of 
these employees are women, accounting for 30 percent of all women in the 
labor force. Among private sector office workers, 57 percent work in the low-
union-density industry groups of services (only 5.7 percent union) and finance, 
insurance, and real estate (only 2.5 percent union). With barely over ten 
million total private sector union members, the labor movement can ill afford 
to overlook the thirteen million nonunion women who work in private sector 
clerical occupations (BLS 1991). 
Concerned trade unionists are now searching for appropriate models for 
organizing and representing these workers. Two schools of thought have 
emerged. Some believe that clericals are like other workers and can be orga-
nized when job-related concerns predispose them to action. According to this 
view, private sector clerical organizing can proceed if and when unions devote 
sufficient attention and resources to the endeavor using conventional organ-
izing techniques. Other unionists argue that clericals are different. Not only 
are they primarily women, but they also tend to be traditionally feminine and 
turned off by macho blue-collar unionism. According to this interpretation, 
a special approach is required regarding style, tactics, and/or issues to be 
addressed. 
I will focus on one highly visible private sector clerical organizing victory: 
the 1988 union win among Harvard University clerical and technical em-
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ployees. The Harvard case is, in many ways, representative of the success 
unions have experienced among university-based clerical workers in recent 
years using rank-and-file grassroots oriented campaigns. And, as a private 
sector campaign that confronted intense management opposition, it also offers 
tactical lessons that are relevant beyond the confines of academia. Perhaps 
most important, the Harvard case presents us with a distinct organizing and 
bargaining model whose relevance to other organizing efforts deserves careful 
evaluation: the Harvard Union of Clerical and Technical Workers (HUCTW) 
not only employed a grassroots organizing approach, but also devised a unique 
bargaining strategy that succeeded in institutionalizing and preserving rank-
and-file involvement. 
How Organizable Are Clerical Workers? 
The available evidence suggests that clericals are just as likely to be pro-
union as other workers. This conclusion is based in part on recent opinion 
polls and union-sponsored surveys that have consistently disclosed that un-
represented women workers are more positively disposed toward unionization 
than are unrepresented men. Reinforcing evidence is offered by Ruth Milk-
man, who has uncovered a secondary phenomenon: the propensity of women 
to support unionization increases as the proportion of women in the work 
unit grows (Milkman forthcoming). In other words, women in gender ho-
mogeneous work groups offer the most congenial target for union organizers. 
Because clerical work is predominantly staffed by women, this information 
should be encouraging to unions interested in organizing clericals. 
Additional support for this optimistic assessment is offered by Phil Corn-
stock, of the Wilson Center for Public Research, and Cynthia Costello. Based 
on thirty-eight thousand responses from nonunion women to Wilson Center 
surveys between 1982 and 1989, Comstock concludes that women workers 
are increasingly attracted to unions because the majority now work out of 
economic necessity and have a long-term attachment to the labor force (BNA 
1990b:C-2). Costello's research demonstrates that women clerical workers 
are potentially as oppositional and militant as unionized male workers (Cos-
tello 1987). 
Although there is general agreement among trade unionists on organizing 
potential, there is considerable disagreement about the best strategy for reach-
ing clericals. Many concur with Comstock that organizing women clericals is 
not substantially different from organizing other workers. Comstock argues 
that the concerns of the "new women workers" are converging with those of 
their male counterparts. He points specifically to low-paid office workers who 
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are responsive to organizing because they "have job related complaints, [and] 
believe that 'something needs to be done' to improve their earnings, treatment 
and opportunities" (Comstock 1989:10). Comstock offers an optimistic as-
sessment of the potential for traditional unions to organize clericals with 
standard approaches emphasizing issues of pay, benefits, and working 
conditions. 
Others are skeptical of the ability of male-dominated unions to effectively 
address the concerns of women clericals. Milkman (forthcoming) and Costello 
(1987) see clericals organizing, in part, on the basis of gender ties. Similarly, 
Naomi Baden argues that unions must use approaches that are sensitive to gen-
der differences. Female office workers are most likely to respond positively to 
women organizers who develop collective workplace leadership and emphasize 
the emotional and personal rewards of unionization (Baden 1986). Ruth 
Needleman adds that women expect more from unions than men, and they 
respond best to organizers who pay attention to the complexity of workplace 
relationships and who facilitate rank-and-file participation (Needleman 1988). 
Even among those who agree that standard union approaches are inappro-
priate for women clericals, there is some disagreement over whether the work 
culture and values of clericals promote or hinder unionization. In a case study 
of a strike by clerical employees at a Wisconsin insurance company, Costello 
concludes that the women's willingness to fight management's sex discrimi-
nation practices reflects a more militant style than is usually attributed to 
clerical workers (Costello 1987). But Roberta Lynch of AFSCME disagrees. 
She views the "female" culture of clerical work as a hindrance to unionization. 
Clericals tend to be passive and traditionally feminine, and thus averse to 
strikes and other forms of direct action. Furthermore, they value their close 
working relationship with professionals and managers, and worry that a third-
party union might create an uncomfortable adversarial environment (Lynch 
1986). 
Karen Nussbaum of 9 to 5, the National Association of Working Women, 
partially reconciles these apparently contradictory views. She notes that or-
ganizers must be patient because most clericals have no experience with unions. 
Trust must be cultivated in order to help clericals overcome their fear: of the 
unknown, of being ostracized by their boss or coworkers, of being mistreated 
or fired, of strikes, of unions as impersonal third-party intruders, and so on. 
Once clericals resolve to support a union, their commitment is firm because 
the process has been painful and they have exercised such great care in reaching 
the decision. When challenged, this commitment readily transforms into 
militance (Nussbaum 1986). 
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Clerical Organizing in Higher Education 
One of the clearest indications of the potential for clerical organizing is the 
success unions have experienced among the employees of colleges and univer-
sities. Although many of the victories in this arena have resulted from a natural 
extension of the growth in public sector unions in the 1970s, unionization 
has also spread to clericals at private institutions. While precise figures are not 
available, it is probable that unionization levels among clericals at public 
universities are comparable to those of other state and local government 
employees. It is also clear that the clerical employees of private universities are 
more likely to be union members than are other private sector white-collar 
workers. Roughly half of the bargaining units were first certified in the 1980s, 
with very few university clericals represented prior to 1970. Remarkably, 
clerical workers now have union representation on 70 percent of the campuses 
where organizing campaigns were conducted in the 1970s and 1980s (Hurd 
1989b). 
Although on a broad scale unionization has spread rapidly among clerical 
workers in higher education, specific campaigns tend to move slowly. These 
workers are initially skeptical of unions and carefully evaluate the decision to 
support an organizing campaign. In response, most unions have adopted a 
grassroots approach in which the union staff member helps build a large 
representative internal committee; the committee then does the actual organ-
izing. Most of the organizing is one-on-one, worker to worker. Although time-
consuming, grassroots organizing builds a base of highly dedicated activists. 
Two successful examples of this style are the Columbia University campaign 
by United Auto Workers District 65 and the Yale University campaign by the 
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (Hurd 1989a, 1986; Ladd-
Taylor 1985).1 
If leaders of a preexisting staff association support union affiliation, a win 
is more likely. At Vassar College, for example, a staff association was formed 
in 1975 by clerical, technical, and professional employees to organize social 
events and, on occasion, to present concerns to the college's administration. 
By 1985 the association's leaders had become frustrated with the administra-
tion's lack of responsiveness and invited six unions to make presentations at 
1
 It is not uncommon for a union to lose a first election, maintain a presence, then eventually 
win bargaining rights. This scenario is especially likely where management aggressively opposes 
unionization. At the University of Cincinnati, for example, SEIU District 925 began organizing 
in 1984, losing its initial representation election in 1986 by fifty votes in a unit of 1,400. The 
union filed for a second election in 1988 and won by 170 votes (Schneider 1990). 
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open lunchtime meetings. The leaders then decided to seek collective bar-
gaining rights with the assistance of the Communications Workers of America 
(CWA). In a subsequent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election, 
the membership voted 76 percent in favor of joining the CWA (Beluardo 
1986). 
Where a substantial portion of the work force is familiar with unions, 
reticence diminishes and organizing proceeds more quickly. Cuyahoga Com-
munity College is located in heavily unionized Cleveland, Ohio. When SEIU 
District 925 decided, to organize the college's clerical workers in 1982, two 
bargaining units, representing the blue-collar workers and the faculty, already 
existed on the campus. Because of the heightened familiarity with unions there 
was less fear, and District 925 distributed union authorization cards only two 
months after its initial contact, quickly signing up 65 percent of the workers 
(Hill 1985). 
Although diverse in many ways, most successful college and university 
campaigns share one important element: the clericals involved come to view 
the union as their own organization. At Vassar and Cuyahoga Community 
College, the organizing efforts were initiated and controlled by the clerical 
workers themselves, with the parent unions providing technical and legal 
support. At Yale, Columbia, and Cincinnati, the campaigns were based on 
the grassroots organizing philosophy, and the workers "assumed ownership" 
of their locals. College and university clericals are more likely to support 
unionization if they are convinced that the bargaining agent will be controlled 
by the membership. The specific parent union is largely irrelevant, with at 
least sixteen national unions and many independent locals serving as bargain-
ing agents at campuses across the country. Although there are some cases 
where clericals view the union as a service organization and have neither 
demanded control nor asserted ownership, the typical university clerical union 
is created and thrives because of rank-and-file activism. 
The Early Stages of Organizing at Harvard 
Harvard University's clerical campaign, the first in which a grassroots ap-
proach was fully institutionalized into the ongoing representational activities 
of a union, confirms the importance of the grassroots organizing approach. 
Union organizing among white-collar workers at Harvard spanned nearly 
two decades. Early organizing led to elections in 1977 and again in 1981 at 
Harvard Medical School, both resulting in narrow defeats for District 65. 
District 65 affiliated with the United Automobile Workers (UAW) in 1981, 
and the UAW then assumed responsibility for the organizing efforts at Har-
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f for the organizing efforts at Har-
vard. In 1984, the UAW filed for a third election at the medical school, but 
the university challenged the unit definition and the NLRB agreed, expanding 
the bargaining unit to include all of Harvard's clerical and technical employees 
(Golden 1988:40-41). 
Kristine Rondeau went to work as a research assistant at the Harvard School 
of Public Health in 1976, and was a volunteer in the 1977 District 65 
campaign. During the 1981 election she worked full-time as a member of the 
union's organizing staff. After the 1981 defeat she stayed with the UAW and 
became the lead organizer at Harvard. In 1985 Rondeau and six other staff 
members left to form the independent Harvard Union of Clerical and Tech-
nical Workers (HUCTW) (Golden 1988:41). 
For a year and a half the seven organizers (all former Harvard employees) 
operated on a shoestring budget funded primarily by donations. The 
HUCTWs perseverance during this difficult period was instrumental in win-
ning respect from a broad cross-section of the clerical and technical employees 
and dissolving concerns that the union was an outside force (Solomon 1990). 
Although the HUCTW affiliated with the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) in January 1987, it had estab-
lished itself as the grassroots domain of Harvard clerical workers. AFSCME 
provided much-needed financial support, but the local was allowed almost 
complete autonomy (Golden 1988:40-42, 45). 
Rondeau and her fellow organizers developed HUCTWs strategy, borrow-
ing some tactics from the successful clerical campaigns at Yale and Columbia. 
Virtually all organizing was conducted one-on-one, usually over lunch. In 
these discussions, HUCTWs staff members and rank-and-file activists em-
phasized how a union could help individual workers confront their power-
lessness. As Rondeau said, "You have to strengthen people as individuals, and 
you have to find a way for them to develop their own self-confidence. You 
have to find a way for them to express anger at being powerless yet somehow 
represent themselves in a positive way that works for them" (Green 1988:6). 
Each worker was encouraged to define her own issues, while the union pro-
vided the support and sense of community necessary to overcome isolation. 
The organizing task at Harvard was enormous: thirty-seven hundred em-
ployees working in two thousand isolated offices and laboratories scattered 
among four hundred buildings. With AFSCME's financial support, the local's 
organizing staff was increased in 1987 to sixteen. Eight were former Harvard 
employees and the other eight continued to hold part-time jobs at the uni-
versity. The organizers divided the campus into twenty-two areas, each with 
its own organizing committee. These area organizing committees met weekly 
over lunch with a staff member to discuss progress and strategy and to identify 
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potential recruits for a campus-wide organizing committee. Eventually, the 
larger campus-wide organizing committee included 450 members, with at 
least one from each building (J. Diamond 1988). 
The organizers worked with the committee members to help them develop 
basic interpersonal skills, concentrating on how to form a relationship and 
how to listen. Committee members had to overcome their own fears and 
approach other workers to discuss the union one-to-one. Workers were not 
pressured, but were encouraged to support the union and to become involved 
to the degree that they were comfortable (Leavitt 1990). Member Donene 
Williams said, "There was a strong emphasis on doing it ourselves, and doing 
it our way" (Williams 1990a). 
The 1988 Victory 
In December 1987, HUCTW staff and rank-and-file leaders decided that 
support was sufficiently broad and solid to initiate a card campaign. Members 
of the campus-wide organizing committee were given cards and went back to 
the workers in another series of one-on-one meetings to collect signatures. In 
March 1988 HUCTW filed for an election with the NLRB after signing up 
a majority of the unit (V. Diamond 1988). 
The union's reliance on face-to-face organizing by Harvard workers was 
designed to build commitment prior to filing for the election and to provide 
the best possible defense against management's inevitable resistance efforts. 
Rondeau described the reasoning behind the philosophy: "They have to be 
intellectually and emotionally committed. Otherwise, when there's an anti-
union campaign, you lose them" (Golden 1988:41). The preelection organ-
izing merely reinforced the earlier attention to individual worker concerns. 
Organizing committee members kept track of all union supporters. Anyone 
who was wavering received diligent one-on-one attention at home, at lunch, 
and at work in a process one organizer called "polite yet ruthless" (Golden 
1988:44). 
The union's campaign encouraged workers to stand together to gain power. 
Its central theme was the "philosophy of voice." By emphasizing worker 
empowerment and involvement in determining the conditions of their em-
ployment in order to improve quality of life on the job, HUCTW was able 
to avoid confronting management on specifics. With democratic decision 
making as the key issue, stronger group identity was also facilitated (Leavitt 
1990; Byrne 1990a). 
This is not to say that specific issues did not arouse the ire of workers. Susan 
Manning identified pay as her key concern, while Bertha Ezell expressed 
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inizing committee. Eventually, the frustration that personnel rules had blocked her career advancement because 
:e included 450 members, with at she did not have the correct credentials (Weinstein 1988). For those with 
I 1988). \ young children, affordable day care was a primary need and the union made 
ttee members to help them develop a special effort to highlight this concern (Noble 1988). The union also focused 
>n how to form a relationship and on matters important to older long-term employees, such as pensions and 
to overcome their own fears and health care (Feinberg 1987). The campaign was never limited to these specific 
ion one-to-one. Workers were not [ issues, however. HUCTWs focus on empowerment offered each worker a 
t the union and to become involved potential solution to the problem most important to her or him. 
: (Leavitt 1990). Member Donene HUCTW also emphasized how needs were interrelated and helped indi-
sis on doing it ourselves, and doing viduals realize that they were not just unionizing for themselves but for their 
\ coworkers as well. Pauline Solomon, for instance, said "From the beginning 
[the organizers] took the approach that if I wanted someone to support my 
issue then I should support their issue" (Solomon 1990). 
Group support and cooperation was facilitated, in part, by the workers' 
i rank-and-file leaders decided that " •' \ common identity as women. Women made up over 80 percent of the unit 
initiate a card campaign. Members and many viewed their job-related difficulties from a feminist perspective. 
were given cards and went back to Barbara Horell supported HUCTW because she did not want "to be relegated 
le meetings to collect signatures. In ", : to undervalued 'women's work'" {Chicago Tribune 1988). Pauline Solomon's 
»n with the NLRB after signing up j involvement was precipitated by concern for pay equity: "If you compared 
• our skills with men doing work that required a similar level of education and 
rganizing by Harvard workers was training, we would be.making much more money" (Solomon 1990). 
ing for the election and to provide - The way pro-feminist union organizers defined certain issues also fostered 
nent's inevitable resistance efforts. , gender consciousness among workers. The union focused on the affordability 
the philosophy: "They have to be of child care, a major burden for low-wage clericals but a minor irritation for 
. Otherwise, when there's an anti- the mostly male faculty. Similarly, pension deficiencies were discerned as 
1988:41). The preelection organ- particularly severe because of the blocked upward mobility and substandard 
on to individual worker concerns. j pay typically associated with the clerical and technical jobs held mostly by 
k of all union supporters. Anyone women. At union rallies organizer Joie Gelband would hop on a piano and 
n-one attention at home, at lunch, sing to the tune of "Diamonds Are a Girl's Best Friend": "A pat on the head 
died "polite yet ruthless" (Golden can be quite condescending, but unions are a girl's best friend" (Warren 1988). 
; Because specific issues were secondary, it was possible to forego traditional 
ers to stand together to gain power. % \ campaign literature. Instead the organizers and committee members concen-
f voice." By emphasizing worker trated on building relationships among supporters to strengthen the feeling 
lining the conditions of their em- , of community. Newspaper articles about the campaign were copied by the 
ife on the job, HUCTW was able | union and circulated to reinforce the notion that the HUCTW was doing 
ecifics. With democratic decision ' something important. Newspaper articles, however, never substituted for per-
lentity was also facilitated (Leavitt sonal contact. 
Although traditional campaign literature was scarce, posters, bumper stick-
lot arouse the ire of workers. Susan ers, and buttons were integral to the campaign. This paraphernalia helped 
ern, while Bertha Ezell expressed y ' popularize two slogans that became central to the organizing effort: "It's not 
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Anti-Harvard To Be Pro-Union" and "You Can't Eat Prestige." The prestige 
associated with university employment is a barrier to organizing university 
clericals, and was especially noticeable at internationally renowned Harvard. 
The union slogans attacked this issue head-on, pointing out that on the one 
hand, to be rewarding a job must offer more than prestige alone, and on 
the other, that unionization need not undermine the institution itself. The 
HUCTW went to great lengths to convince workers that they could use the 
union to increase their influence, improve their work environment, and make 
Harvard a better university in the process (Golden 1988:47). 
From the beginning of the organizing process, the HUCTW reached out 
to the broader university community and to potentially sympathetic organi-
zations and individuals outside of Harvard, informing them of the clerical 
workers' concerns and updating them on campaign developments. In 1988, 
when the university unleashed a sophisticated anti-union campaign in response 
to the union's card-signing effort, the HUCTW was prepared and called on 
students, faculty, and community supporters to urge Harvard president Derek 
Bok to refrain from engaging in an anti-union campaign (Rondeau and Manna 
1988). Bok received hundreds of letters and phone calls imploring him to 
permit a fair vote. 
Shortly after filing, the union's "neutrality campaign" went into high gear. 
Twenty-seven distinguished Harvard professors (many holding endowed 
chairs) issued a public statement urging "that the University management 
remain scrupulously neutral during the organizing drive" (Adams et al. 1988). 
The Boston City Council passed a resolution requesting that Harvard "refrain 
from anti-union campaigns and further attempts to delay a representation 
election" (Boston City Council 1988). Students signed petitions; church, civil 
rights, women's, and labor organizations sent representatives to visit Bok; and 
hundreds attended a candlelight vigil outside of Bok's home (J. Diamond 
1988). Although Harvard continued to wage war on the union, the "neutrality 
campaign" clearly put the university on the defensive. 
Harvard's carefully crafted anti-union campaign balanced on a fine line 
between academic free speech and union busting, as the university attacked 
the union with what the Chicago Tribune called a "velvet scalpel" (Warren 
1988). The university emphasized Harvard's record as a "progressive, respon-
sive employer," one that paid competitive salaries with good benefits, and 
offered quality child care (Weinstein 1988). The administration attempted to 
appear objective, factual, and academic. Four booklets titled "Consider the 
Facts" and numerous letters stating management's case were sent to each 
employee. Throughout, union representation was portrayed as inappropriate 
for Harvard's white-collar worker; 
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»n was portrayed as inappropriate 
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that would result (J. Diamond 1988). 
The university held 120 "captive audience" meetings on work time. Al-
though attendance was technically voluntary, recalcitrant employees fre-
quently received notices of meetings with an added message that their 
supervisors "have been made aware of the day and time of these meetings and 
join [the administration] in encouraging you to attend" (Harvard Crimson 
1988b). Clerical and technical employees opposed to the union joined together 
as the "Staff Support Action Committee" to assist management's campaign 
(Weinstein 1988). 
The administration relied heavily on supervisors to assist their effort. A 
104-page briefing book, full of such information as lists of legal anti-union 
statements (and their unlawful counterparts); strikes at other universities; 
examples of restrictive and undesirable clauses from "representative" 
AFSCME contracts; and the positive aspects of pay, benefits, and working 
conditions at Harvard, was prepared for supervisors (BNA 1988). Supervisors 
were informed that the university had the right to fire those supervisors who 
were uncooperative (Harvard Crimson 1988a). 
President Bok attempted to remain above the fray. He had established his 
own academic reputation in the field of labor-management relations, writing 
books and articles that in some cases were explicidy critical of management 
efforts to resist unions. But as an administrator facing an organizing campaign, 
Bok saw the situation in a different light. A few weeks before the election he 
sent a four-page letter to each employee, using somewhat tortured reasoning 
to explain his position: 
[Unions are] a good thing for America and for working people. . . . However, I 
am not at all persuaded in this case that union representation and collective 
bargaining will improve the working environment at Harvard. . . . [Unions 
have] resisted efforts to allow supervisors and employees to vary the way they 
work in response to their special needs and capabilities (BNA 1988). 
The union did not wither under management's onslaught. Hundreds of 
copies of the university's briefing book for supervisors were printed by the 
union and distributed to its members. A video was produced simulating an 
anti-union meeting to prepare members for the captive audience events (Hart 
1988). The anti-union propaganda was undermined by HUCTWs grassroots 
strategy: organizing committee members talked individually with coworkers 
about the administration's intimidation efforts (Williams 1990a). 
In the end, the HUCTW prevailed. The final tally in the May election was 
1,520 "yes," 1,486 "no," with 41 challenged ballots, only 3 less than required 
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to overturn the election. The union was ecstatic. Kristine Rondeau proclaimed, 
"We want to make this a model for women everywhere" (J. Diamond 1988). 
Ecstasy did not cloud reality, however. HUCTW representatives declared they 
would take one day off and then resume organizing the people who voted no 
(BNA 1990a). 
Management interpreted the union's get-out-the-vote tactics as "harass-
ment," "threats," and "systematic interrogation," and seven days after the 
election they (management) filed technical objections to the vote with the 
NLRB (Fatsis 1988). The union responded by staging a protest at Harvard's 
June 9 commencement (United Press International 1988) and by requesting 
that supporters call or write Derek Bok and ask him to "reconsider this 
intentionally divisive behavior" (HUCTW 1988). 
Although the administration persisted with its appeal, NLRB Administra-
tive Law Judge Joel Harmatz dismissed all charges against the union on 
October 21 (Harvard College JD (BOS)-257-88). Harvard decided to halt 
its legal challenge at this stage and forego appeals. On November 4 President 
Bok announced that the university would recognize the union. He also prom-
ised to pursue a "constructive and harmonious" relationship with the 
HUCTW (Butterfield 1988). 
The HUCTW Contract 
With the election outcome settled, the HUCTW was determined that its 
emphasis on grassroots participation would continue. The union's commit-
ment to the philosophy of voice influenced its bargaining strategy, and its goal 
of worker empowerment eventually produced an agreement that incorporated 
innovative models of democratic decision making. Union certification was 
followed by a burst of organizing and the addition of many new members. 
HUCTW leaders adopted a cautiously conciliatory posture, reminding the 
university that they desired to work cooperatively to improve Harvard. Pres-
ident Bok's appointment of Harvard professor emeritus and former U.S. 
Secretary of Labor John Dunlop as chief negotiator signaled a softening on 
management's side as well. The two sides agreed to forego formal negotiations 
for ninety days. Instead, they established two eight-member transition teams 
(one for each side) that held regular meetings. This allowed the two parties to 
learn about each other, while simultaneously permitting the animosity created 
during the election and appeal process to cool (Bureau of National Affairs 
1990a). 
During the ninety days, the union surveyed members and prepared contract 
goals and objectives. In February 1989, the HUCTW distributed a list of 
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bargaining objectives to all of the clerical and technical workers. Included 
were standard union concerns such as an improved salary structure, expanded 
benefits, fair transfer and promotion policies, and health and safety protection, 
as well as less common objectives such as a family policy, employee partici-
pation, and mutual respect and cooperation. To handle negotiations, the 
union held an election to choose sixty-five negotiating team members 
(HUCTW 1989; Williams 1990a). 
The first set of discussions focused on devising a unique participatory 
structure for the formal bargaining. Nine separate bargaining tables were 
established to deal with separate sets of key issues: salaries and job classifica-
tions; pensions and retirement; family policy, child care, and elder care; af-
firmative action; health and safety; health and disability benefits; personnel 
practices; education and career development; and employee participation. The 
elected members of the union negotiating team each served on only one table. 
Each table met at least once a week, although some tables met more frequently 
as the two sides approached final agreement (Williams 1990a; BNA 1989a). 
The bargaining format was also unusual. The typical adversarial approach 
of offer and counteroffer was shunned, and lawyers were excluded from the 
negotiations. At each table general discussion of the issues under consideration 
was followed by a review of various options for dealing with the concerns of 
both sides. Specific contract proposals were debated only after a reasonably 
thorough understanding of mutual interests and conflicting objectives had 
been achieved. This approach was possible because of the union members' 
commitment to Harvard, and because John Dunlop recognized that the union 
was interested in constructive changes (BNA 1989a). 
Although negotiations proceeded amicably, the HUCTW did not abandon 
its aggressive side. The union continued to organize^ nonmembers, and the 
rank and file actively participated in a contract campaign that culminated in 
a series of rallies workers enthusiastically supported (average attendance was 
nine hundred) (Williams 1990a). 
Negotiations were a resounding success. The two sides reached agreement 
on June 25, 1989, and the contract was ratified June 29 with 94 percent 
voting in favor (Bureau of National Affairs 1989c). The contract itself was 
remarkable. It not only offered sizeable economic gains to the members, 
but also dramatically altered workplace relations by giving workers more of 
a voice. 
The HUCTW estimated that members would receive average pay increases 
of 32.5 percent over the life of the three-year agreement.2 More astonishing 
2Calculated from data included in H U C T W 1989; Harvard Vice-President for Finance 
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than the substantial wage gains were the considerable improvements in a 
broad range of fringe benefits, including health insurance, dental insurance, 
disability, and pensions. Nonmonetary protections were also achieved, in-
cluding an agency shop, strong affirmative action and equal opportunity 
language, and health and safety protections (HUCTW 1989). As the AFL-
CIO News pointed out, the contract broke "important new ground in a 
number of key areas" (AFL-CIO 1989). Harvard agreed to scholarships for 
child care, a cooperative effort to expand affordable child care options, a 
thirteen-week maternity leave period, an extensive family leave program, and 
a referral service for elder care (Harvard University and HUCTW 1989a: 16— 
17). 
But the contract's most unusual feature was its extensive reliance on joint 
labor-management teams. The family policy section included a union/uni-
versity committee to administer the child care scholarship program. Health 
and safety committees were called for in each school or administrative unit. A 
joint committee was established to promote affirmative action and antidiscri-
mination programs. Three separate committees were set up to study and 
implement changes in the job classification system. And, the first substantive 
section of the contract outlined an extensive employee involvement program 
(HUCTW 1989). 
The contract established a participatory system featuring the Joint Council 
(JC), "intended to be a forum for the discussion of all workplace matters 
which have a significant impact on staff" (Harvard University and HUCTW 
1989a:4). Each school and administrative unit was required to set up at least 
one JC. In essence the JCs were designed to provide forums for ongoing 
discussion and to resolve concerns that normally would be processed through 
contract provisions with specific work rules. The Harvard contract was devoid 
of such rules. 
Each JC was required to have equal representation from the bargaining unit 
and management and a cochair selected by each side. Either side would be 
allowed to raise issues for consideration and every effort would be made to 
reach consensus on these matters. Consensus recommendations would then 
be passed on to the dean of the school or a top management official of the 
administrative unit. If consensus could not be reached or the relevant dean or 
administrator failed to act, the issue would be referred to the University JC 
(UJC). The UJC was empowered to seek the assistance of a mediator. In no 
case would the individual JCs or the UJC have the authority to modify the 
Robert Scott estimated that the cost of pay hikes would total less than 25 percent due to 
turnover (BNA 1989b). 
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5-6). 
The HUCTW-Harvard agreement also set up a separate system to address 
specific contract violations normally handled through standard grievance pro-
cedures. The agreement also defined a dispute much more broadly than in 
most contracts, thus allowing for subtle issues of "harassment" or "personality 
problems" to be resolved under this procedure. A worker (or workers) expe-
riencing workplace-related difficulties would first be required to attempt to 
resolve the situation informally with the supervisor. The HUCTW and the 
personnel office would assist if necessary. If informal resolution proved im-
possible, the case would move to the Local Problem Solving Team (LPST), 
made up of an equal number of management and union representatives from 
each school or administrative unit. The LPST would attempt to reach a 
consensus solution. If it failed, it would refer the case to the University 
Problem Solving Team (UPST). If the UPST was also unsuccessful, it could 
choose to select a mediator. The mediator would attempt to facilitate an 
agreement, and if this were not possible she or he could make a final decision. 
However, this arbitration power was limited to disputes that involved inter-
pretation or application of the contract (Harvard University and HUCTW 
1989a:7-8). 
A final remarkable aspect of negotiations was a cooperative effort to rewrite 
the personnel manual. After deleting all sections of the old manual that would 
be covered in the contract, the personnel practices negotiators discussed a 
variety of preexisting rules and regulations for possible changes. Among the 
topics considered were hours of work, holidays, vacation, sick pay, layoffs, 
breaks, and disciplinary policy. In most cases, reaching agreement on specific 
rules was reasonably easy and policy changes were undramatic. More difficult 
and especially important to the union was integrating flexibility throughout. 
Ultimately, the introduction to the negotiated manual made clear that it was 
"not intended as a rigid rule book applicable to every situation and workplace 
in a highly diversified University" (Harvard University and HUCTW 1989b: 
2). According to Joie Gelband, who represented the HUCTW at the personnel 
practices table, "The whole purpose of the manual is to promote flexibility 
and the whole issue of mutuality—that it's in the best interest of everyone for 
the employee and supervision to reach agreements" (Gelband 1990). 
Both sides praised the agreement. Derek Bok declared, "We look forward 
with increasing confidence to a positive relationship between Harvard and the 
union." Kristine Rondeau was ebullient: "It's the prettiest contract you've 
ever seen. It's got great economics and cooperative labor-management rela-
tions, and it addresses the concerns of working women" (Cooperman 1988). 
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The tone of the language in the contract and personnel manual reflected 
the harmony evident in the public statements from former antagonists. The 
contract preamble stated: 
It is our common purpose . . . to work together to advance the long-term role 
of Harvard University as a premier center of learning. . . . We have learned 
that we share a commitment to the processes of reasoned discourse in resolving 
problems and issues that may arise.. . . We are optimistic about [the] future" 
(Harvard University and HUCTW 1989a:2). 
Similarly, the personnel manual proclaimed: "The University and HUCTW 
share the view . . . that participation and creative problem-solving are basic 
features of the relationship" (Harvard University and HUCTW 1989b:2). 
Among the« union leaders and rank-and-file activists, the most important 
contract provisions were about employee involvement. As Kristine Rondeau 
said when the agreement was announced: "From our first step in organizing 
Harvard back in the seventies . . . our union's goal has been to get our members 
on the other side of Harvard's doors into the rooms where decisions affecting 
workers' lives are made. We stand on the verge of making that goal a reality" 
(PR Newswire 1989). While the joint councils and other committees were 
viewed as pivotal by local leaders, they conceded that most rank-and-file 
members placed higher value on the wage and benefit improvements (Williams 
1990a; Leavitt 1990; Byrne 1990a). 
Both the union and Harvard's administration praised the contract's flexi-
bility, which was achieved in three ways. First, the contract established a 
decentralized employee involvement plan allowing each school or administra-
tive unit to retain its own autonomy and focus on its own problems. Second, 
many aspects of the relationship between management and workers (such as 
discipline) were omitted from the contract and consigned to the personnel 
manual, with the qualification accepted by the HUCTW that the manual 
offer only guidelines that might not be applicable to every situation. Third, 
the contract was largely devoid of work rules, a feature that was the university's 
highest priority. Vice-President Scott noted: 
The deans indicated that the highest priority in negotiations should be given 
to retaining flexibility of administration by avoiding work rules such as 
seniority, bumping, limitations on hiring, transfer rights, job guarantees, 
prohibitions of layoffs, etc. (BNA 1989b). 
Another aspect of the contract that appealed to both management and labor 
was the absence of a standard grievance and arbitration system. As noted, 
individual workplace problems were to be handled by joint labor-management 
teams rather than by individuals; the definition of a grievance was broadened, 
and the procedure encouraged 
combination with arbitration. 
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In essence, the management assessment of the contract was remarkably 
similar to that of the union's leadership. According to John Dunlop, Harvard 
decided to pursue "a long-term vision rather than any short-term advantage" 
and to promote "employee participation and individual initiative in a spirit 
of trust and open communication" (Bureau of National Affairs 1989b). 
Implementing the Contract 
After three years under the contract, the union retains its commitment to 
the participatory system. The UJC has been constructed and twenty-seven 
JCs have been formed by schools and administrative units. The JCs meet 
biweekly and, in effect, continually negotiate over working conditions. In 
addition, the UPST and nineteen LPSTs have been set up, although they 
typically meet only when there is a specific complaint requiring attention. 
The JCs have proven to be the most important component of the partici-
patory system. The experience to date has been mixed, with "one-third doing 
great . . . , one-third making progress . . . , and one-third requiring close 
attention" (Williams 1990b). In most cases union representatives have been 
better prepared than management for JC meetings and have initiated topics 
for discussion. How effectively a JC functions tends to be determined by the 
attitudes of the management representatives. The successful JCs share a com-
mon characteristic: management representatives and the dean or administrator 
involved are self-confident managers who do not view sharing power as a 
threat (Williams 1990b). In instances where management still believes that it 
should be fighting the union, the JCs are making very little progress. James 
Healey, a professor of industrial relations at Harvard selected to mediate 
HUCTW contract disputes, concedes that "there are islands of unspoken 
resistance, where administrators give lip service to the concept but then act in 
a way which subverts the process" (BNA 1990c:G-5). 
Even where JCs are staffed by recalcitrant management representatives or 
where communication is poor, the HUCTW retains its commitment to the 
process. HUCTW activist Marilyn Byrne observes, "A lot of what the JCs 
have accomplished is subtle, in the realm of gaining credibility by showing 
management that we are committed, are reasonably intelligent, have initiative, 
and can contribute to the decision-making process" (Byrne 1990b). 
The successes offer the union cause for optimism. Among the improvements 
initiated by JCs are new or refurbished staff lounges in individual schools, 
more desirable summer and holiday leave policies for library employees, better 
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work sharing when vacancies arise, steps to reduce workplace inconveniences 
during construction, and revised hiring procedures (Gelband 1990; BNA 
1990c:C-3). The HUCTW views the University Health Services JC as a 
model; barriers have been broken down between doctors and support staff 
and a positive atmosphere has been created by focusing on the mutual goal of 
providing high-quality health care. A specific innovation developed by the 
Health Services JC is an orientation program for new physicians coordinated 
and delivered by support staff who are HUCTW members (Williams 1990b). 
So far, the LPSTs have played an auxiliary role. Each LPST has been 
involved in only a few formal cases. The university-wide UPST has recom-
mended solutions or assisted in about twenty-five individual cases, three of 
which eventually went to mediation before being resolved (BNA 1990c:C-4). 
The HUCTW, however, believes that the greatest measure of success in the 
problem-solving process is that 350 complaints have been resolved informally, 
either directly by the employee and supervisor or with the assistance of a union 
representative and personnel officer (Williams 1990b). 
In sum, the participatory system is considered to be a qualified success by 
the union. That the problem-solving process is working is evidenced by the 
limited reliance on the LPSTs, resulting from the resolution of difficulties at 
the lowest levels. The experience with employee involvement in decision 
making through the JCs has been uneven due to pockets of management 
resistance. Nonetheless, much has been accomplished, partly because the 
union has taken advantage of the relatively open system and undefined nature 
of the process to set the agenda for many JCs. As a result, specific improvements 
have been achieved that would normally be possible only during contract 
negotiations. Given the unit-specific nature of these gains, it legitimately could 
be argued that many never would have occurred under a traditional bargaining 
relationship. 
In explaining the HUCTWs ongoing commitment to the participatory 
system, local president Donene Williams notes that "JC work is slow, the 
consensus decision making process is slow . . . [But] the flexibility to reach a 
consensus decision together gives our contract its strength" ("Williams 1990b). 
Marilyn Byrne adds, "I don't know if it's the kind of process that can work 
in every environment. For union members it requires a large obligation" 
(Byrne 1990b). Because extensive rank-and-file involvement is required, 
HUCTW leaders view continued union diligence as essential. Kristine Ron-
deau warns that "a union that's not well organized shouldn't even think about 
doing this" (Bureau of National Affairs 1990c:C-5). 
Significantly, the participatory system negotiated at Harvard actually has 
served to foster union involvement. Union membership has expanded and 
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commitment has remained remarkably high. Seventy-three percent of the unit 
now belong to the local, and nearly 15 percent of members actively participate 
in union affairs. Approximately one hundred serve on JCs, sixty on LPSTs, 
and forty on special joint labor-management committees (BNA 1990c:C-5). 
As of 1992, many of the union representatives to the JCs also serve on 
HUCTW organizing committees. There are five organizing committees with 
twenty to thirty members each who attempt to organize new employees and 
long-term employees who have not yet joined. Organizing committee mem-
bers also serve as a communication link to the membership as the HUCTW 
continues to eschew literature in favor of one-on-one contact. In addition to 
the organizing committees, the union structure includes 4 officers, 13 execu-
tive board members, and 108 elected union representatives. The elected rep-
resentatives' primary duties are to assist informally in the problem-solving 
processes, and to meet one-to-one with members to answer questions con-
cerning rights under the contract (Williams 1990a; Leavitt 1990). 
The extensive member involvement explains local leaders' confidence that 
the HUCTW is prepared to meet all challenges. If management's commitment 
to meaningful participation wanes, the union is ready to respond. According 
to Rondeau, "If we ever really need [contract guarantees], we'll fight hard.. . . 
If they fight us, we'll fight; if we have to do it the old-fashioned way, we'll do 
it as well as anyone" (BNA 1990c:C-5). But it is clear that the HUCTW does 
not want to do it the old-fashioned way. The union eschewed a rule-based 
relationship because of its conviction that no one set of rules would apply to 
all of Harvard's workers and workplaces (Williams 1990b). The members are 
convinced that the system is working because "employees and supervisors are 
talking, and using moral reasoning rather than rules to solve their problems" 
(Gelband 1990). 
Learning from Harvard Clerical Workers 
The labor movement has cause to celebrate the Harvard organizing victory, 
but was it any more than just an isolated NLRB election win? The HUCTW 
contract has some appealing features, but what difference should this make to 
workers not employed at Harvard? Although the case is exceptional in some 
ways,3 and the clerical work force will not unionize en masse because of what 
3The prestige of Harvard and the lure of Cambridge (a mecca for leftists) combine to attract 
a relatively young, well-educated group of clerical workers who are highly mobile and politically 
progressive {Chicago Tribune 1988; Weinstein 1988). Furthermore, Harvard is not a typical 
employer. Even prior to unionization it offered its employees relatively good pay, benefits, and 
working conditions. Harvard's liberal traditions and contacts with the labor movement made 
it more susceptible to outside pressures than many private sector employers. 
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happened in Cambridge, an evaluation of the experience reveals several im-
portant lessons for unions. 
The Harvard case confirms that clerical workers generally and university 
clericals in particular respond favorably to a grassroots organizing approach. 
The clerical and technical workers at Harvard clearly wanted a union that 
encouraged their full participation. Specific tactical aspects of the campaign 
helped to reinforce the union's philosophy of voice. The HUCTW focus on 
empowerment allowed workers to define their own issues, and offered them 
a credible process for solving problems, achieving fair treatment, and attaining 
influence. Similarly, the decision not to use traditional campaign literature 
served to reinforce the grassroots campaign since committee members them-
selves becamethe conduit of information. 
Because of the skepticism clerical workers feel toward unions, it is essential 
that organizing campaigns reflect a clear understanding of the concerns of the 
workers. At Harvard this meant emphasizing voice and building an extensive 
grassroots structure. Workers responded positively when they could embrace 
the union as their own. In contrast to organizing constructed upon worker 
dissatisfaction, the process at Harvard created a positive environment from 
which worker empowerment evolved. The organizers did not sell the union 
to the workers, but rather sold the workers on their own potential. The 
HUCTW broke new ground by taking the logical next step and institution-
alizing participation through the bargaining process and the contract itself. 
The experience demonstrates that the grassroots approach can produce not 
just a union victory, but an excellent first contract. 
The union built power through its enduring attention to organizing, which 
continued even after the contract was ratified. The ability to be both adversarial 
in certain instances and nonadversarial in others meant that the HUCTW 
could bargain from a position of strength and also maintain its commitment 
to worker involvement. Those portions of the contract that institutionalize 
participation through JCs, LPSTs and other joint labor-management com-
mittees will undoubtedly appeal to clericals (and other white-collar workers) 
who are seeking respect and influence through their unions. The participatory 
system enhances the clericals' close association with professionals and man-
agers, whereas a purely adversarial union could interfere with workplace rela-
tionships. The model of labor-management cooperation propagated by the 
agreement could prove to be an effective organizing tool in other campaigns. 
The desire of clericals to seek justice while preserving harmony in the work-
place has at last been fashioned into a contract that can serve as a prototype. 
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unionization necessarily creates a rigid, rules-based, adversarial environment 
poisoned by third-party interlopers. 
To return to the debate raised early in the chapter regarding the appropriate 
strategy for organizing clerical workers, the Harvard case also lends support 
to those who argue that special approaches are required. The women at 
Harvard responded to a campaign that displayed female leadership and what 
Kristine Rondeau has referred to as the "feminine model of organizing" (BNA 
1990b:C-l). Most of the organizers were women, a collective rank-and-file 
leadership system was developed based on interpersonal bonds, and the self-
empowering rewards of unionization were emphasized. 
The Harvard experience could be interpreted as consistent with the views 
of those who describe clericals as traditionally feminine and concerned with 
maintaining good relations with their supervisors as well as those who argue 
that the clerical work culture is conducive to the expression of militance. This 
seeming contradiction was best reflected in the way that the HUCTW dealt 
with the prestige issue. Rather than allowing the close working relationship 
between clericals and professors to become an impediment to organizing, the 
HUCTW attacked the issue head-on. Status concerns were turned into an 
advantage as the workers embraced the concept that "It's not anti-Harvard to 
be pro-union." This slogan also sent the message that the HUCTW was not 
a typical adversarial union.4 Although the work culture was not oppositional, 
this model created an environment that allowed women clericals to become 
strong union advocates. 
Although the Harvard case may be most relevant to organizing and repre-
senting university clerical workers, key aspects are generalizable to other work-
places. Particularly instructive is the tactical response of the union to the 
university's sophisticated union resistance activities. Reprinting and distrib-
uting Harvard's supervisors' manual, for example, served to demystify man-
agement's campaign. Even more important was the union's reliance on regular 
one-to-one contact with supporters as its primary response to management's 
efforts. This grassroots approach helped resolve doubts before they got blown 
out of proportion. In addition, the effort to reach out to the broader com-
munity of women's organizations, labor unions, religious groups, and political 
allies served two functions: It put management's anti-unionism in the limelight 
Similarly, the union handled the faculty skillfully. By reaching out to the faculty and asking 
only for neutrality so that a reasoned choice could be exercised in the best tradition of the 
academy, the H U C T W persuaded faculty to remain silent and thus largely defused this potential 
barrier. On campuses where the faculty are unionized, more openly courting their active support 
can be quite helpful. 
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and put Harvard on the defensive. Simultaneously, it helped tie the clerical 
workers into the broader labor and social movement, diminishing the feeling 
of isolation that can be so debilitating in the face of management's anti-union 
onslaught. 
Clearly, no one model is appropriate for every union and every group of 
workers, and the Harvard case does not prove that traditional organizing and 
representation methods cannot be successful. Nonetheless, unions would be 
well served to consider the innovations reported here. The HUCTWs success 
in institutionalizing participation after the organizing phase ended, and its 
flexibility in pursuing cooperation with management while maintaining te-
nacious membership commitment to the union are especially noteworthy. 
It would be a mistake to conclude that the participatory model of organizing 
and representing workers followed at Harvard should only be implemented 
in clerical campaigns or in other settings where women workers predominate. 
In fact, the HUCTW success presents a serious challenge to traditional union 
methods. It is increasingly difficult to "sell" unions today, and most would 
benefit from certain aspects of the HUCTW model, regardless of the occu-
pations or demographics of their constituencies. Developing rank-and-file 
involvement and collective leadership, letting workers define the issues, and 
promoting worker empowerment are all essential to a long-term strategy to 
outlast management and fulfill the goal of organizing the unorganized. 
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